CSA Jesse S. SMITH

Male 1836 - 1865  (29 years)


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  • Name CSA Jesse S. SMITH 
    Born 1836  Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location 
    Gender Male 
    Died 01 Feb 1865  Elmira, New York Find all individuals with events at this location 
    Person ID I12497  Bob-Millie Family Tree
    Last Modified 12 Oct 2022 

    Father John M SMITH
              b. 1797, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location
              d. Aft 1850, Sumter County, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location  (Age > 54 years) 
    Relationship natural 
    Mother Elizabeth UNKNOWN
              b. 1800, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location
              d. Aft 1850, Sumter County, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location  (Age > 51 years) 
    Relationship natural 
    Family ID F5330  Group Sheet  |  Family Chart

    Family Ellen Hazeltine SUBER
              b. 1841, Hamburg, Edgefield District, South Carolina Find all individuals with events at this location
              d. Bef 21 Jan 1920, Crisp County, GA. Find all individuals with events at this location  (Age < 79 years) 
    Married 30 Oct 1856  Sumter County, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location 
    Children 
     1. Florence SMITH
              b. 1859, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location  [natural]
     2. Ida Carrie SMITH
              b. 15 Oct 1861, Andersonville, Georgia Find all individuals with events at this location
              d. 06 Mar 1934, Richland, GA Find all individuals with events at this location  (Age 72 years)  [natural]
    Last Modified 12 Oct 2022 
    Family ID F384  Group Sheet  |  Family Chart

  • Event Map
    Link to Google MapsMarried - 30 Oct 1856 - Sumter County, Georgia Link to Google Earth
     = Link to Google Earth 

  • Photos
    1860 Randolph Co GA: Jesse Smith
    1860 Randolph Co GA: Jesse Smith
    1860 Randolph Co GA: Jesse Smith
    1860 Randolph Co GA: Jesse Smith

  • Notes 
    • NOTE 1./ Summary of the Battle of WILDERNESS, VA: MAY 5TH - 7TH, 1864 in which Sgt Jesse Smith was wounded and believed captured.

      Wilderness, Va., May 5-7, 1864. Army of the Potomac. On March 9, 1864, Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant was raised to the rank of lieutenant-general and placed in command of all the United States armies in the field. The interval from that time until the 1st of May was spent in planning campaigns, and in
      strengthening, organizing and equipping the several armies in the different military districts. Grant remained with the Army of the Potomac, which was under the immediate command of Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, and which had for its objective the destruction of the Confederate army under command of Gen. Robert E. Lee.

      Lee's army-the Army of Northern Virginia-consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps, respectively commanded by Lieut.-Gens. James Longstreet, R. S. Ewell and A. P. Hill, and the cavalry corps of Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart. Longstreet's corps included the divisions of Kershaw and Field, and the artillery brigade under Brig.-Gen. E. P. Alexander. Ewell's corps was made up of the divisions of Early, Edward Johnson and Rodes, and the artillery brigade of Brig.-Gen. A. L. Long Hill's corps was composed of the divisions of R. H. Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, and his artillery was commanded by Col. R. L. Walker. Stuart's cavalry embraced three divisions, commanded by Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee and W. H. F. Lee, and the horse artillery under Maj. R. P. Chew. The Union army numbered about 120,000 men of all arms, exclusive of Smith's corps. Lee's army numbered about 61,000 not including the forces under Beauregard on the Petersburg lines and the troops left in the defenses of Richmond, about 30,000 in all. Ewell's corps was intrenched along the south side of the Rapidan, his right resting near Morton's ford a short distance above the mouth of Mine run. The upper half of the intrenched line was held by Hill's corps, the left extending to Barnett's ford, about 5 miles west of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. Longstreet's command was at Gordonsville, the junction of the Orange & Alexandria and the Virginia Central railroads. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House, about half way between Longstreet and the line along the Rapidan, from which point he could easily communicate with his corps commanders, and detachments of cavalry watched the various fords and bridges along the river.

      Grant's plan was to cross the Rapidan at the fords below the Confederate line of intrenchments move rapidly around Lee's right flank and force him either to give battle or retire to Richmond. As soon as this movement was well under way, Gen. Butler, with the Army of the James, was to advance up the James river from Fortress Monroe and attack Richmond from the south. The region known as the Wilderness, through which the Army of the Potomac was to move, lies between the Rapidan the north and the Mattapony on the south. It is about 12 miles wide from north to south and some 16 miles in extent
      from east to west. Near the center stood the Wilderness tavern, 8 miles west of Chancellorsville and 6 miles south of Culpeper Mine ford on the Rapidan. A short distance west of the tavern the plank road from ermanna ford crossed the Orange & Fredericksburg turnpike, and then running southeast for
      about 2 miles intersected the Orange plank road near the Hickman farmhouse. The Brock road left the Orange & Fredericksburg pike about a mile east of the tavern and ran southward to Spottsylvania Court House, via Todd's tavern. The first iron furnaces in the United States were established in the Wilderness, the original growth of timber had been cut off to furnish fuel for the furnaces, and the surface, much broken by ravines, ridges and old ore beds, was covered by a second growth of pines, scrub-oaks, etc., so dense in places that it was impossible to see a man at a distance of 50 yards.
      Between the Orange plank road and the Fredericksburg pike ran a little stream called Wilderness run, and north of the latter road was Flat run the general direction of both streams being northeast toward the Rapidan into which they emptied. On the Orange plank road, about 4 miles southwest from the Wilderness tavern, was Parker's store.

      From the Confederate signal station on Clark's mountain, near the right of Ewell's position, the Federal camps could be plainly seen. On May 2nd Lee, accompanied by several of his generals, made a personal observation, saw the commotion in the Union lines, and rightly conjectured that an early
      movement of some kind was in contemplation. He accordingly directed his officers to hold their commands in readiness to move against the flank of the Federal army whenever the orders were given from the signal station. It was on this same day that Meade, by Grant's instructions, issued his orders for the advance. Knowing that his every movement was observed by the enemy, he determined to cross the Rapidan during the night. At midnight on the 3rd the 5th and 6th corps, preceded by Wilson cavalry division, began crossing at Germanna ford. The 2nd corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry, crossed at Ely's ford farther down the river. On the evening of the 4th Warren's corps went into bivouac near the Wilderness tavern, Sedgwick was between Warren and the Rapidan; Hancock was near the
      cross-roads at Chancellorsville and Burnside, with the 9th corps, was moving by a forced march from the Rappahannock river toward Germanna ford in response to a telegram from Grant. Wilson's cavalry covered both the plank road and the turnpike west of Warren's camp, the main body of the division
      being at Parker's store and a small force at Robertson's tavern on the pike. The orders issued that evening for the movements of the army on the 5th would indicate that both Grant and Meade believed that Lee would fall back toward Richmond upon finding his flank turned by a superior force. In this they were mistaken. Lee had outgeneraled Hooker on the same ground a year before, and he now decided to make an effort at least to drive the Federals back across the Rapidan. Therefore, as soon as he learned on the morning of the 4th that Meade's advance had crossed the river, Ewell was directed to move by the Orange turnpike, Hill by the plank road, and Longstreet was ordered to bring up his corps with all possible despatch. That night Ewell was bivouacked about 5 miles from Warren's camp, Hill was at Verdiersville, about 3 miles in the rear of Ewell, and Longstreet was at Brock's bridge, 10 miles
      east of Gordonsville.

      During the night Lee sent word to Ewell to "bring on the battle now as soon as possible," and ordered Hill to move forward at the same time as Ewell. Warren's orders were to move at 5 a.m on the 5th to Parker's store and extend his right toward the Wilderness tavern to connect with the 6th corps. He moved on time, Crawford's division in advance, Wadsworth's in the center and Griffin's in the rear. About 7 o'clock Meade received a despatch from Warren, announcing that the Confederates were in some force on the pike about 2 miles west of the tavern. Meade hurried to the front and directed Warren to attack with his entire corps to develop what part of Lee's army was there. Hancock, who was moving to take a position on Warren's left, was ordered to halt at Todd's tavern and await further orders. Sedgwick was ordered to move by a cross-road that left the Germanna road at Spottswood, attack any Confederate force he might find in his way, and connect with Warren's right on the pike. Grant joined Meade soon after these orders were issued and the two generals established their headquarters on the knoll around the Lacy house, a little west of the Wilderness tavern.

      At 8 o'clock Crawford was in a strong position on the Chewning farm, where he was directed to halt until Griffin and Wadsworth were ready to move against the enemy on the turnpike, when he was to send one of his brigades to join in the attack. About noon Griffin attacked vigorously striking Jones brigade of Johnson's division and driving it back in some confusion through the supporting line, after which he
      advanced against Battle's and Doles' brigades of Rodes' division. Wright of the 6th corps, was to have moved forward on Warren's right, but owing to the dense thickets and the uneven surface of the ground, he was unable to connect with Griffin's line in time to carry out the original plan of attack. As Griffin advanced, his right therefore became exposed and Ewell hurled the brigades of Gordon and Daniel
      against his flank forcing Ayres' brigade back across the pike. Seeing that his line was in danger of being broken, Griffin then gave the order to fall back. In executing this order his line was so closely pressed by the Confederates that he was compelled to abandon 2 pieces of artillery. Wadsworth, in moving forward through the thickets, lost his direction and exposed his left flank to Gordon and Daniel, just after they had forced Griffin to retire. These two brigades now attacked Wadsworth and drove back his left in disorder. The Confederates then poured through the gap thus formed and struck Dennison's brigade of Robinson's division in the flank as it was moving to Wadsworth's support. Pursuant to orders
      Crawford had sent McCandless' brigade to join Wadsworth's left, but the latter had begun his advance before McCandless could reach the position assigned him. The brigade was moved forward, however, in the direction that McCandless supposed would bring him into the desired place, and came up just in
      time to be engaged by Gordon's victorious forces after Dennison's defeat. A sharp fight ensued, but McCandless was greatly outnumbered and was finally forced to withdraw with a severe loss in killed and wounded and the capture of several hundred of his men. Ewell then reformed his line on the ground where he was first attacked and intrenched his position. Warren fell back about 300 yards and formed a new line with his right resting on the pike.

      Early in the morning Wilson left Col. Hammond, with the 5th N. Y. at Parker's store and pushed on
      w/ the rest of his command toward the Craig meeting-house. Soon after Wilson's departure Hammond became engaged with Hill's advance and Crawford threw forward a skirmish line of his infantry to
      support the cavalry. This line soon encountered Kirkland's brigade of Heth's division and with Hammond's regiment was slowly forced back along the plank road toward the Wilderness tavern. Getty's division was hurried forward to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads, and a
      despatch was sent to Hancock directing him to move up on the Brock road to Getty's support. Getty reached the cross-roads just in time to secure that important position, and formed his division in two lines of battle at right angles to the plank road, Wheaton's brigade in the center, Grant's on the left and
      Eustis' on the right. Hill advanced against this line, but received such a galling fire that he speedily retired and for the next two hours everything was quiet, except for the almost constant firing of the skirmishers. When Hancock received the order at 9 a.m. to halt at Todd's tavern his advance was
      already some 2 miles beyond that point, and this caused some delay when, two hours later, he was ordered to move to the support of Getty. At 2 p.m. Birney's division came up on the Brock road and formed on Getty's left in two lines of battle along that road. The divisions of Mott and Gibbon followed in order, as fast as the narrow road and dense undergrowth would permit, and also formed in two lines on the left of Birney. Barlow's division, on the extreme left, was thrown forward to some high, clear ground, which was the only place along the line where artillery could be used to advantage. Here Hancock
      massed all his batteries except Dow's and one section of Ricketts', the former of which was placed near Mott's left and the latter on the plank road. As fast as the different commands fell into position breastworks of logs and earth were thrown up. The second line also threw up works in the rear of the first, and later a third line was constructed behind the divisions of Mott and Birney. Before his troops were in position Hancock received orders to attack, and a little after 3 p.m. Getty was directed to attack at once, without waiting for Hancock. During the lull of two hours Hill had been industriously pushing his men into position and forming a junction with Ewell's right. He was anxiously awaiting and expecting the arrival of Longstreet, but that officer had delayed his advance, because he was unwilling to take the road
      assigned him by Lee, and waited for permission to select his own route. The result was that when darkness fell on the 5th he was still miles away from Hill's right.

      Although Getty received orders about 3 o'clock to attack at once, his advance was delayed an hour, as he was engaged in shifting Wheaton's brigade to the right of the plank road to make more room for the 2nd corps. At 4:15 he moved forward down the plank roads, but had not proceeded more than 300
      yards when he encountered Heth's division. Ricketts' guns had advanced with the line of infantry and did good service in forcing back the enemy's center, but Hill's line overlapped Getty's flanks and the slight advantage gained in the center was more than offset by the severe losses on both the right
      and left, where the Federal attacks were repulsed, Grant losing nearly 1,000 men, about one-half of his brigade. Seeing that Getty had met the enemy in force, Hancock ordered Birney's and Mott's divisions to his support, and a little later sent Carroll's brigade of Gibbon's division to the right of the plank road to support Eustis. About 5:30 the enemy charged and forced back the Union line for 50 yards. One of
      Ricketts' guns had to be abandoned on account of the horses being killed. Some of the Confederates reached this gun and planted their colors on it, but they were driven away before they could withdraw it. About the time that this charge was made Hancock had completed the formation of his line and
      attacked Hill's right with great vigor, Smyth's "Irish" brigade driving back the enemy's line for some distance. In his report Hancock says: "The battle raged with great severity and obstinacy until 8 p.m. without decided advantage to either party." While this was apparently true at the time an hour more of daylight would have witnessed Hill's defeat. He had extended his lines to the southward to cover the ground that had been assigned to Longstreet. This thin line was now shattered and disjointed, and had it been severely pressed for an hour longer it must inevitably have been broken at some point and the whole corps driven from the field. During the action Gen. Hays' commanding one of Hancock's brigades, was killed; Col. Carroll and Gen. Getty were both severely wounded, but neither left the field until the fighting was over for the day.

      In the afternoon some heavy skirmishing took place on the Federal right. About 5 p.m. Ricketts' Brigade, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, who had relieved Col. B. F. Smith that morning, Neill's brigade of Getty's division, and part of Wrights's 1st brigade, under Col. W. H. Penrose,
      attacked the Confederate brigades of Hays and Pegram in a strongly intrenched position on the ridge south of net run. Pegram placed some artillery on his left, the fire from which the field with considerable loss. Seymour continued the contest until dark, but was unable to dislodge the enemy from his position. The Federal loss in killed and wounded was heavy on this part of the field, Col. Keifer, commanding
      Seymour's first line, being severely wounded. On the other side Gen. Pegram was wounded and compelled to leave the field.

      While these different infantry engagements were going on the cavalry was not idle. At the Craig meeting-house Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division encountered Rosser's brigade of Hampton's cavalry and drove it back about 2 miles. Rosser was then strongly reinforced and Chapman fell back on
      the 1st brigade at the junction of the Parker's store and Catharpin roads. Soon after this Wilson ordered his whole command to Todd's tavern, where he had been directed by Sheridan to meet Gregg's division. On the way to Todd's he was closely pressed by the Confederate cavalry. Gregg arrived at the tavern about the same time as Wilson, when the two divisions immediately assumed the offensive and drove the enemy beyond Corbin's bridge across the Po river.

      Immediately after the fighting ceased on the 5th, Hancock, Warren and Sedgwick received orders to attack at 5 o'clock the next morning. Burnside, then in the vicinity of Germanna ford, was instructed to march at 2 a.m., with Stevenson's, Potter's and Willcox's divisions, and be in position to join in the general advance at the hour designated. From prisoners captured during the day it was learned that Longstreet was hourly expected and Hancock was notified to keep a close watch on his left. Barlow's
      division, with all the artillery of the 2nd corps, was therefore placed in position to protect the left flank and a strong skirmish line was thrown out on the Brock road. The Federal attack was anticipated by the enemy, who began firing on both the left and right a few minutes before 5 o'clock. Soon after the firing commenced, Hancock attacked in two lines, extending across the plank road, Getty's division, with
      Eustis on the right, Wheaton in the center and Grant on the left, supporting the divisions of Mott and Birney, the latter being in command of Hancock's right wing. The Confederates were pushed back about a mile and a half from the cross-roads when Wadsworth's division came sweeping in from the right,
      which threw the enemy into confusion and resulted in the capture of several hundred prisoners. The whole line then pressed on after the almost routed enemy for nearly a mile farther; Lee's trains and headquarters were in full view and the battle was nearly won, when a heavy artillery fire was opened on the Union lines from Poague's batteries masked in the shrubbery on the south side of the road, and it was learned that one of Longstreet's divisions had finally connected with Hill's right. In the impetuous advance Hancock's line had become somewhat disordered and he ordered a halt to readjust his lines before engaging the fresh troops. Getty had been wounded during the action and turned over the
      command of the division to Wheaton. He was now relieved by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division and formed his command along the original line of battle on the Brock road. At 7 a.m. Gibbon, commanding the left wing, was directed to attack the Confederate right with Barlow's division, but owing to the
      expected attack by Longstreet the order was but partially carried out. Frank's brigade only was thrown forward to feel the enemy's position and after some sharp fighting it connected with Mott's left. About 8 o'clock Stevenson's division of Burnside's corps reported to Hancock. Burnside, with his 2nd and 3rd divisions, had been expected to move by a cross-toad toward Parker's store, on Birney's right, and
      attack simultaneously with the rest of the line. About the time of Stevenson's arrival at the Brock road, Hancock received word from Meade that Burnside had then pushed forward nearly to the store and was ready to attack. This information proved to be erroneous and was in a measure contributory to the disaster that overtook Hancock later in the day. Burnside was delayed by a lack of definite information regarding the ground over which he was to move and the dense thickets he encountered, so that it was 2 p.m. before his attack was commenced. A few minutes before 9 o'clock Birney, Mott and Wadsworth, with part of Stevenson's division and three brigades of Gibbon's, resumed the attack along the plank road
      and were soon furiously engaged with the enemy. Just previous to this, rapid firing was heard in the direction of Todd's tavern, which Hancock supposed to be the threatened flank attack by Longstreet, and this caused him to send Brooke's brigade of Barlow's division out on the Brock road to occupy a line of breastworks there to hold Longstreet in check. Leasure's brigade of the 9th corps and Eustis' of the 6th were held in readiness to support Barlow. As a matter of fact Longstreet was at that moment in Hancock's front, the firing at Todd's being an engagement between Sheridan and the Confederate cavalry. In his report Hancock says: "The arrangements made on my extreme left to receive Longstreet
      prevented me from pushing my success at the time when Gen. Birney was driving Hill on the plank road."

      South of the plank road and nearly parallel to it was the unfinished Gordonsville & Fredericksburg railroad. About 10 o'clock Longstreet sent Gen. Mahone with four brigades to move along the line of this railroad and gain Hancock's flank and rear, while the brigades of Law, Gregg and Benning engaged the
      Federals in front. Mahone first encountered Frank's brigade, which had nearly exhausted its ammunition and was therefore compelled to retire before the vehement flank attack. He then struck the left of Mott's division, which in turn was forced back in some confusion. Heroic efforts were made to rally the men and reform the line along the plank road by throwing back the left, but the troops had been engaged all morning under a heavy fire in the dense forest and their formation was too irregular for such a ovement. At Birney's suggestion the whole line was then withdrawn and reestablished in the breastworks along the Brock road. When Longstreet saw that Mahone's attack was successful he ordered a general advance along the plank road, hoping to crush Hancock's line. Mahone's men, upon seeing the head of the Confederate column, mistook it for a fresh body of Union troops and fired a volley, killing Gen. Jenkins and wounding Longstreet. Lee then assumed command of his right wing in person and ordered
      the attack to be postponed, although the Confederate line was an hour before Mahone struck the left of Hancock's line Cutler's brigade of Wadsworth's division was driven back to the open ground near the Lacy house, but Birney sent two brigades and recovered the lost ground, though at considerable loss. During this part of the battle Gen. Wadsworth was mortally and Gen. Baxter severely wounded.

      From 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. all was comparatively quiet along Hancock's front. About 2 o'clock Robinson's 1st brigade, under Col. Lyle, and two regiments of heavy artillery reported to Hancock and were massed near the cross-roads in reserve. At this time Burnside made an assault on the enemy's line near the Tapp house, north of the plank road, and drove it back in disorder, but part of Heth's division and Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's came up as reinforcements and regained all the lost ground. At 3 p.m. Hancock and Burnside both received orders to attack at 6 o'clock. They were not permitted to wait until
      that hour, however, for at 4:15 the enemy advanced against Hancock in force, pressing up to the edge of the abatis, less than 100 yards from the first line of works, where they halted and opened a fierce fire of musketry. This was continued for half an hour, during which time the Union line held firm. Then a portion of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's gave way. Concerning this break, Hancock says in his
      report: "The confusion and disorganization among a portion of the troops of Mott's and Birney's division on this occasion was greatly increased, if not originated, by the front line of breastworks having taken fire a short time before the enemy made his attack, the flames having been communicated to it from the forest in front (the battle-ground of the morning), which had been burning for some hours. The reastworks on this portion of my line were constructed entirely of logs, and flames which it was impossible at that time to subdue, the fire extending for many hundred paces to the right and left. The intense heat and smoke, which was driven by the wind directly into the faces of the men, prevented them on portions of the line from firing over the parapet, and at some points compelled them to abandon the line."

      As soon as Mott's men gave way the Confederates advanced And, some of them reached the bst'tworks and planted their colors thereon. But their victory was of short duration, for Carroll's brigade moved by the left flank, advancing at the double-quick with fixed bayonets, and drove the enemy back with heavy loss in killed and wounded, some of the dead being afterward found inside the works. Dow's battery, one section of which was near the plank road and the others in the second line near Mott's left, did good service in firing on the enemy, both during his advance and retreat. After the repulse of the Confederates by Carroll, Lee withdrew his troops from the contest, and there was no more fighting along the Brock road that day, the order for the attack being countermanded because Hancock's men were almost out of ammunition and it was too late to replenish the supply. When Burnside heard the firing in Hancock's front he advanced against the enemy before him, but his attacks were isolated and nsupported and the only important result attained was to prevent Heth and Wilcox from moving to Lee's support

      When the attack began in the morning Wright's division vigorously assaulted Early's intrenchments in his front, but was repulsed with heavy loss. A second attack met with no better success, and as the withdrawal of Burnside's corps had left Sedgwick's right exposed he was ordered to intrench his
      position and act on the defensive. Warren's attacks on Ewell were also unsuccessful, as the enemy's lines here had been strengthened during the night and several pieces of artillery added. During the day Sedgwick was reinforced by Shaler's brigade, which had been guarding the trains, and Johnston's
      brigade was sent to Early. Both sides were thus reinforced and some sharp fighting occurred during the afternoon, the attacks of Warren and Sedgwick serving to keep Lee from concentrating his entire force against Hancock. Just before sunset Gordon's brigade, supported by Johnston's, made an attack on Sedgwick's right flank, while Pegram engaged the Federals in front. Shaler's brigade was engaged in building breastworks and the sudden descent of the enemy threw it into confusion, rolling it back on Seymour's brigade, which also fell into some disorder. Seymour and Shaler, with several hundred of their memen, were captured. Johnston passed to the left of Gordon and gained Wright's rear, where he captured a few prisoners. Wright promptly restored order among the troops and repulsed the attack of Johnston. Gordon's men were thrown into confusion and Early ordered both brigades to withdraw. In his Memoir Early says of this flank attack: "It was fortunate, however, that darkness came to close this
      affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our condition." This flank attack of Early's was the last important event in the day's contest, and, in fact, closed the battle of the Wilderness, for when Federal pickets and skirmishing parties were sent out the next morning no trace of the enemy could be discovered on the field of the day before. The Army of Northern Virginia had retired to its line of intrenchments and the redoubtable Lee had evidently abandoned his offensive campaign.

      The Union loss in the battle of the Wilderness was 2,246 killed 12,037 wounded and 3,383 captured or missing. No doubt many of the wounded were burned to death or suffocated in the fire that raged through the woods on Hancock's front. Concerning the enemy's casualties Badeau, in his Military History of U. S. Grant, says: "The losses of Lee no human being can tell. No official report of them exists, if any was
      ever made, and no statement that has been put forth in regard to them has any foundation but a guess. It seems however, fair to presume that as Lee fought outside of his works as often as Grant, and was as often repelled, the slaughter of the rebels equalled that in the national army. The grey coats lay as thick as the blue next day, when the national scouts pushed out over the entire battle-field and could discover no living enemy "

      Source: The Union Army, vol. 6